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emanating from Papua New Guinea (PNG) Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill from late 2017, a period in 
which he has not only on several occasions: 
• publicly promised that the referendum
arrangements will be honoured in full by the
national government (for example, PNG Post-
Courier 19/3/2018; The National 3/5/2018 and
24/5/2018);
• promised that the referendum will not only be
held but will be held on the ‘target date of June
2019’ (PNG Post-Courier 6/4/2018; The National
24/5/2018);
but has also: 
• claimed that the referendum will not be about
independence (PNG Post-Courier 8/5/2018; The
National 3/5/2018); and
• implied that the referendum could be delayed
beyond June 2020 in a number of statements,
indicating that weapons disposal and attaining
standards of good governance are prerequisites for
the holding of the referendum (Tlozek 2017; PNG
Post-Courier 8/3/2018).
Against this background, the paper asks whether
the referendum arrangements have contributed to — 
and are likely in the future to contribute to — peace 
in Bougainville as was intended by their inclusion in 
the BPA.
Where are the arrangements located?
The referendum arrangements are set out in several 
separate but closely related existing documents. In 
addition three other categories of document envisaged 
by the constitutional laws could also be used to make 
additional provision.
Having considered the origins and aspects of the 
shaping of the referendum arrangements in the first 
of these paired Discussion Papers, this paper presents 
an overview of the arrangements for the referendum 
as set out in the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA)1 
and the constitutional laws that give effect to that 
agreement. The arrangements include not only detailed 
provisions about the way in which the referendum 
is to be conducted, but also provision for agreement 
between the national government and the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government (ABG) in the lead up to 
the referendum on critical aspects of the referendum 
that the BPA deliberately left to later decision-
making processes. These include issues of central 
importance in a referendum, such as which agency 
will have responsibility to conduct the referendum, 
the qualifications for voting by Bougainvilleans who 
are not resident in Bougainville, the question or 
questions to be asked in the referendum, the date of 
the referendum, and decisions about implementation 
of the outcome of the referendum. In general, 
the arrangements for the referendum are not well 
understood, in part because they were negotiated 
some 17 years ago, but also because they are scattered 
through different documents and are inherently 
complex. As a result, some serious misconceptions 
have emerged about key aspects of the arrangements.
Hence this second Discussion Paper seeks 
to not only clarify some of the complexity of the 
arrangements, but also to address a few major 
misunderstandings that have arisen in recent public 
debates about the referendum arrangements. It also 
provides an overview of some of the developing activity 
towards the holding of the referendum. Further, it 
interrogates the mixed messages about the referendum 
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likely that section 62 envisages mainly administrative 
arrangements for filling inconsistencies and so forth, 
but it is also possible that the section might be used 
by the agency, at least, to provide a basis for making 
rules about the conduct of the referendum. In the 
first half of 2018, officers of the PNG Electoral 
Commission and advisers from the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
conducted a careful analysis of the 65-page schedule 
to the organic law, with a view to identifying potential 
difficulties that might be caused by any inconsistency, 
gap or uncertainty in the schedule. Initially they were 
proposing that extensive amendments might need 
to be made to the schedule. But as the procedures 
involved in making amendments to an organic 
law are onerous and time-consuming, and bearing 
in mind the limited time left within which the 
referendum must be held, they instead turned to 
section 62. Under a draft constitutional regulation 
being prepared in part as a result of the analysis 
of the schedule, provision is being included to the 
effect that the agency to conduct the referendum will 
have authority to make rules to deal with difficulties 
arising from any inconsistency, gap or uncertainty in 
the schedule.
Second, section 63 of the organic law provides that 
laws can be passed by either government which may 
‘confer powers, functions, duties or responsibilities on 
the agency or make other provision in relation to the 
conduct of the referendum’, though any such law must 
be agreed to by the other government. To date there has 
not been any proposal for making such laws.
Third, section 389 of the national constitution and 
section 66 of the organic law empower PNG’s National 
Executive Council (NEC) to make constitutional 
regulations prescribing all matters that, by part 
XIV of the national constitution or the organic law 
respectively, ‘are required or permitted to be prescribed, 
or that are necessary or convenient to be prescribed, for 
carrying out or giving effect to’ either part XIV or the 
organic law. In June 2018, the two governments agreed 
to develop a constitutional regulation under the organic 
law, largely to make provision for matters which 
the schedule indicates should be dealt with by later 
regulation, including making provision for the number 
of forms required by the schedule (for example, forms 
for enrolment of voters).
The main existing documents are Part XIV of the 
Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea (the Bougainville Government and Bougainville 
Referendum); the Organic Law on Peace-building in 
Bougainville – Autonomous Bougainville Government 
and Bougainville Referendum 2002 (the organic law) 
and the Constitution of the Autonomous Region 
of Bougainville 2004. The provisions in the PNG 
constitution are a brief statement of the main principles 
governing the conduct of the referendum while the 
body of the organic law contains a brief filling out of 
details of some of the principles. The Bougainville 
constitution provides for several discrete matters and, 
notably, for the procedures to be followed should the 
ABG wish to consider the question of the referendum 
not being held (a matter discussed further below). 
The longest and most detailed provisions are 
found in the 65-page schedule to the organic law. It 
contains the detailed arrangements for the conduct 
of the referendum, which are based on the provisions 
of the Papua New Guinea Organic Law on National 
and Local-level Government Elections 1997. The PNG 
constitutional laws were passed by parliament early in 
2002, while the Bougainville constitution was adopted by 
Bougainville’s Constituent Assembly in November 2004.
The lengthy schedule was included in the organic 
law at the insistence of the Bougainville side of the 
negotiations for the BPA. The Bougainvillean negotiators 
were not willing to trust the PNG side to enact the 
necessary arrangements 10 to 15 years or more after the 
BPA was negotiated. At the same time it was recognised 
that there were risks in providing for the detail in an 
organic law enacted so far in advance of the referendum. 
Circumstances might change, new arrangements might 
be needed and mistakes, gaps or inconsistencies might 
be identified. As a result, when the organic law was 
being drafted, three separate mechanisms were included 
to enable either or both governments to deal with such 
problems if and when they arose. It is these mechanisms 
that give rise to the possibility that there could be new 
documents created which will make additional provision 
for the referendum. 
First, section 62 of the organic law provides that 
where a ‘difficulty arising from an inconsistency, gap 
or uncertainty’ arises in the operation of its provisions 
on the referendum, then the difficulty can be 
resolved by either the courts or the two governments 
(ABG and the national government), or the agency 
established to conduct the referendum. It seems 
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the JSB. The constitution also specifies that the dispute 
settlement procedures apply to disputes in relation to 
the referendum (see section 343).
To date, two of the four major subjects left to later 
consultation and agreement have been resolved through 
the JSB. The first is the choice of agency to conduct 
the referendum, while the second is the criteria for 
enrolment of non-resident Bougainvilleans. The other 
two matters — the question or questions to be asked, 
and the date of the referendum — have both been the 
subject of brief consideration by the JSB without any 
decision as yet. There is, however, pressure from the 
ABG for an early decision on the question or questions 
to be asked, as discussed further later in this paper.
Choice of agency to conduct the referendum
The BPA states that the PNG Electoral Commission 
and the authority established to conduct Bougainville 
elections ‘will be jointly responsible for conducting the 
referendum’ (para. 318). The organic law provides for an 
agreement to be reached between the two governments 
on how that joint responsibility should be exercised, 
listing four distinct options: by either of the electoral 
bodies on its own, or the two electoral bodies jointly, 
or a newly established independent agency. In the JSB 
meeting of May 2016, the governments agreed that an 
independent agency should be established to conduct 
the referendum, and in August 2017 the governor-
general signed the charter made under section 58 of 
the organic law for establishing this agency. Called 
the Bougainville Referendum Commission (BRC), 
this new agency will comprise seven members, three 
each appointed by the respective governments and an 
independent chair appointed by the JSB. The three 
members appointed by each government must include 
that government’s electoral commissioner and each 
government is required to appoint at least one female. 
The ABG appointed two persons early in 2018 while the 
national government had not yet made its appointments 
by mid-August 2018. 
The charter for the BRC requires that the BRC 
chair be appointed by the JSB and consensus has 
emerged that it should be an independent person 
with international standing. The December 2017 JSB 
meeting delegated authority to appoint the chair jointly 
to the PNG prime minister and the ABG president. 
While the ABG had expressed interest in seeking 
agreement for appointment of Helen Clark (former 
The fact that the referendum arrangements, as 
they exist at present, are contained in a number of 
different source documents is part of the reason 
why the arrangements are not very well understood. 
Another reason is that the BPA is not very well known. 
It was signed almost 17 years ago and even the events 
of the conflict period that gave rise to the BPA are 
largely forgotten by many involved in referendum-
related activities. This passage of time has seen four 
general elections for the national parliament of PNG 
(2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017) and as there is a turnover 
of well in excess of 50 per cent of sitting members in 
most such elections, there are now almost no members 
of parliament (MPs) that have detailed knowledge 
of the peace process and the complex documents 
generated by it. The turnover of MPs tends to also be 
accompanied by quite a high turnover in senior officers 
in the national public service, and almost all officials 
now engaged in referendum-related activities had no 
involvement in negotiation of the BPA.
Matters for later negotiation
Although the constitutional laws intended to give 
effect to the BPA contain a great deal of detail, it 
was agreed at the time the BPA was negotiated that 
several matters of central importance could not be 
decided then. Instead, these matters were left to be 
decided by the two governments through consultation 
and agreements much closer to the event of the 
referendum. These matters involve: the choice of the 
agency to conduct the referendum, the date of the 
referendum, the question or questions to be asked in 
the referendum, and the qualifications of non-resident 
Bougainvilleans to enrol to vote in the referendum. 
Each of these matters is discussed separately in the 
following sections of this paper.
The BPA and the constitutional laws do not specify 
how these matters are to be negotiated and agreed. 
However, section 332 of the national constitution 
provides the necessary machinery for the two 
governments to jointly oversee the implementation of 
the BPA: the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB). In addition, 
the constitution provides that where disputes arise 
between the governments in relation to the referendum, 
the two governments may make use of the multiple 
stage dispute settlement procedure set out in the 
constitution (see sections 343 and 333–336). The first 
stage of that procedure involves consultation through 
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Bougainville for at least six months will be entitled 
to vote in the referendum. While that was something 
specifically agreed to during the negotiations for the 
BPA, awareness exercises carried out in Bougainville 
in 2017 and the first half of 2018 have shown that 
many Bougainvilleans were not aware that non-
Bougainvilleans will have a right to enrol and to vote. It 
was something about which many were unhappy.
On the other hand, when it comes to persons who 
are not resident in Bougainville, only non-resident 
‘Bougainvilleans’ who meet criteria for determining 
links to Bougainville that must be agreed between the 
two governments will be entitled to enrol (BPA para. 
315 and organic law section 55). The requirement for 
agreement between the governments on the detailed 
criteria must be met before the date for the referendum 
is agreed (see organic law, section 55). In fact, the 
criteria were agreed to by the two governments at 
the June 2018 JSB meeting. It was agreed that a non-
resident Bougainvillean will be entitled to vote in the 
referendum if they are a Bougainvillean as defined in 
section 7 of the Bougainville constitution. That section 
provides that to be a Bougainvillean, a person must be 
a member of a clan lineage owning land in Bougainville 
under customary arrangements, or must be adopted 
into such a clan, or must be married to or a child of 
such a person. In addition, it was agreed that to be 
enrolled a person will be required to be entitled to 
vote in PNG national elections, which will mean that 
they must be citizens of PNG aged 18 years or older 
and resident in PNG. One result of this agreement is 
that non-resident Bougainvilleans living outside PNG 
will not be able to vote in the referendum. The agreed 
criteria must be published in the National Gazette, the 
Bougainville Gazette and in a daily newspaper.
Enrolment of voters
The BRC-TC, with assistance from advisers from IFES 
and the UNDP, has developed plans for enrolment 
of voters using the rolls from the 2015 ABG general 
elections as a starting point, subject to those rolls being 
updated. It is proposed that the updating exercise 
should use assistance from ‘ward recorders’ appointed 
to each of the approximately 450 wards in the ABG’s 
system of local level governments, called community 
governments. In addition, an entirely new roll will be 
needed for the non-resident Bougainvilleans.
New Zealand prime minister and former head of 
the UNDP), when Prime Minister O’Neill proposed 
the former prime minister of Ireland, Bertie Ahern, 
President Momis concurred, to a large extent on the 
basis that by proposing such a person as chair, the 
prime minister was taking an important degree of 
ownership of the referendum process. The offer from 
Prime Minister O’Neill and President Momis was made 
by a jointly signed letter in April 2018 and soon after 
Ahern was reported to be interested in the proposal 
(Dineen 2018). At the time of writing (late August 
2018) Ahern’s acceptance of the appointment had not 
been finalised and so had not been notified in The 
National and the Bougainville Gazette (as required by 
the BRC charter).
Until Ahern’s appointment has been gazetted, he 
cannot preside at meetings of the BRC and the full BRC 
cannot begin meeting, nor can it make an appointment 
of the chief referendum officer who will head the 
staff of the BRC. In the interim, however, the charter 
provides for a BRC Transitional Committee (BRC-
TC) to undertake the work of the commission. The 
BRC-TC comprises the chief secretaries of the national 
government and the ABG, and the respective electoral 
commissioners of the two governments. By mid-August 
2018, the transitional committee had met seven times 
(5 December, 23 February, 15 March, 10 April, and 3 
May, 29 May and 20 July), and has made a great deal of 
progress in advancing the planning of the referendum, 
in large part through the work of four committees 
established at the first meeting with inputs from IFES 
and UNDP advisers.
Who will be entitled to vote in the referendum? 
The introductory paragraphs to the BPA state that 
the ‘agreement provides … for a referendum among 
Bougainvilleans’ (para. 2) and the same wording 
appears in the preamble to the law amending the 
national constitution by way of inserting part XIV. 
On the basis of this wording it might be assumed 
that only ‘indigenous’ Bougainvilleans would have 
the right to vote in the referendum. It was agreed 
during the negotiations for the BPA, however, that all 
persons in Bougainville qualified to vote in elections 
for the national parliament would be entitled to enrol 
to vote in the referendum (see BPA para. 315 and 
section 1.23 of the schedule to the organic law). This 
means that non-Bougainvilleans who have resided in 
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want Bougainville to become independent?’ with 
just two possible response options, being ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
The assumption was that a ‘no’ vote would effectively 
be a vote for continuing autonomy. As a result, this 
proposed question actually offers two options — 
independence and continued autonomy. The same 
proposal was put to the June 2018 JSB and the national 
government indicated it was not ready to discuss the 
question, because it believed legal advice should first 
be obtained about constitutional issues concerning 
the question. The ABG reluctantly agreed to defer 
discussion of the question provided that the deferral 
was for a short period. It was also agreed that joint 
legal advice would be obtained (between the national 
government and the ABG), with the JSB discussion 
deferred to a special JSB meeting to be held before the 
end of July 2018. At the time of writing (late August 
2018) that JSB meeting had not occurred, despite 
considerable efforts by the ABG to secure agreement 
for a date.
It is not entirely clear what constitutional issues 
the national government wants to have considered 
through the proposed joint legal advice. However, it 
is clear that in general it has only been very recently 
that most ministers in the O’Neill government 
have become fully aware of the implications of the 
right that Bougainvilleans have to a referendum 
on independence, and that many ministers find it 
confronting that the national constitution makes such 
provision. Further, there is at least one commentator 
emerging who questions the constitutionality of 
the amendments in part XIV of the constitution 
that provide for the referendum. Social media posts 
by a former MP and lawyer, Daniel Tulapi, have 
been claiming that the amendments to the national 
constitution that provide for the referendum are 
themselves unconstitutional because the parliament 
has no authority to amend the constitution, as it can 
only be amended through a referendum (a claim that is 
entirely without foundation). He further claims that it 
is unconstitutional for the constitution to permit part 
of the country to secede (see Appendix 1). 
Tulapi’s views on this last point are problematic 
in that the national constitution does not, at this 
stage, give a right to Bougainville to secede. It merely 
provides for a right to a referendum on the issue, 
leaving the matter of implementation of the referendum 
outcomes to consultation between the governments 
and final decision-making authority to the national 
In terms of timing of the enrolment process, early 
in 2018 the BRC-TC indicated that to be ready for 
the referendum to be conducted around the target 
date agreed to between the governments in May 2016 
— that is, June 2019 — enrolment would need to 
commence in April 2018. In fact it was not possible to 
begin the enrolment process then because insufficient 
funds were available to meet the estimated cost of K6 
million for the enrolment exercise. In the absence of 
the necessary funding, it is not possible to know when 
the enrolment process will take place.
The subject of the referendum: The question or 
questions to be asked
The BPA (para. 309) and the national constitution 
(section 338) state that the broad subject matter 
of the referendum is the ‘future political status’ of 
Bougainville. This subject matter is to be addressed 
by a question or questions that will be put to voters, 
having first been agreed between the two governments. 
The BPA (para. 310) and the national constitution 
(section 339) require that the question or questions 
must include ‘a choice of separate independence for 
Bougainville’. In formulating the question or questions, 
the two governments are required to ensure that the 
terms of the question or questions ‘avoid a disputed 
or unclear result’ (section 339). The curious wording 
‘separate independence’ was included in the BPA at the 
insistence of the national government’s negotiators on 
the basis that Bougainville is a part of PNG which had 
achieved independence in September 1975, so that what 
was being demanded by Bougainville was a referendum 
about a separate independence from that which PNG 
(including Bougainville) had already achieved. 
Accordingly, while there have been some reports 
of views expressed by the PNG prime minister that 
the referendum will not be about independence (for 
example, Prime Minister O’Neill reported in the PNG 
Post-Courier 3/3/ 2018 and in The National 3/5/2018), 
the clear fact of the matter is that independence must 
be an option offered when the vote is held. It seems 
possible then that the comments in question are in fact 
merely intended to indicate that independence is not 
necessarily the only issue that will be put before voters 
when the referendum is held.
The ABG proposed in a paper presented to the 
JSB meeting of December 2017 that there should be 
a single question asked, along the lines of ‘Do you 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm6                                                                                                                             Department of Pacific Affairs
Anthony Regan
In fact, neither the BPA nor the constitutional 
laws provide any basis for arguing that the referendum 
can be delayed beyond the end of the five-year period 
ending June 2020. Rather they provide that the 
referendum shall be held on a date agreed to by the two 
governments, no earlier than 10 years and no later than 
15 years after the establishment of the ABG. As the 
ABG was established on 15 June 2005, the referendum 
must be held within a five-year window between June 
2015 and June 2020. In reaching agreement on a date 
within that window, the two governments are required 
to take account of two things: whether the weapons 
held by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
and the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF) have 
been disposed of in accordance with the BPA (section 
338(3)(a)) and whether the ABG ‘has been and is 
being conducted in accordance with internationally 
recognised standards of good governance’ (section 
338(3)(b)). The same understanding of the relevant 
provisions has been clearly stated by one of the advisers 
in the national government team that negotiated the 
BPA. Writing in 2007, he said that:
the timing of the referendum in the 5 year 
window allowed, 10–15 years after the 
establishment of the ABG – that is, between 2015 
and 2020 — will be determined by reference 
to weapons disposal and good governance (in 
the case of the latter, defined with regard to 
international standards which are relevant in 
Papua New Guinea) (Wolfers 2007:92). 
If negative assessments were to be made in relation 
to these two issues (weapons disposal and good 
governance), that could influence the governments to 
decide on a date closer to the end, or at the very end 
of the five-year window of 2015 to 2020. It cannot 
result in a delay or deferral of the referendum beyond 
the end of that window. The fact that there can on 
no account be a delay or deferral beyond mid-2020 
is made clear by key wording in both the BPA and 
the national constitution. The BPA states that ‘in any 
case’ the referendum must be held no later than 15 
years after the ABG is first elected, while the national 
constitution says that ‘notwithstanding any other 
provision’ the referendum must be held no later than 
the fifteenth year after the ABG’s first election. This 
wording, in both cases, reflects the clear intention 
of those negotiating the BPA in the aftermath of the 
agreement by the parties to the compromise proposed 
parliament (see below). It is not known yet if views of 
the kind being advanced by Tulapi are ones that the 
national government envisages being considered in the 
proposed joint legal advice called for by the June 2018 
JSB meeting.
There has been some discussion of the possibility 
of more than two options being included in the 
question or questions asked. For example, in addition 
to independence or a continuation of the current 
autonomy arrangements, there could be an option or 
options involving Bougainville remaining part of PNG 
but with a further increased degree of autonomy. It 
is possible to conduct referendums that offer more 
than two options, but there are a number of practical 
difficulties involved which makes such referendums 
quite rare (Tierney 2013). The requirement in section 
339 of the national constitution that the question or 
questions be formulated to avoid a disputed or unclear 
result may militate against inclusion of more than two 
options, in large part because where there are three 
or more options, it is possible that no option receives 
more than 50 per cent of the vote.
Setting the date for the referendum
The provisions of the BPA and the national 
constitution about when the referendum shall be 
held are the most widely misunderstood of all the 
referendum arrangements. Because they include 
references to weapons disposal in Bougainville and 
the need for an assessment of whether or not the 
ABG is meeting good governance standards, these 
provisions have been widely misinterpreted as laying 
down conditions or prerequisites that Bougainville 
must meet before the referendum can be held. The 
clear implication of views of this kind is that, should 
these so-called conditions not be met, the referendum 
can be delayed beyond June 2020. Those advancing 
views of this kind include academic commentators 
(for example, Wallis 2012:37), the report of the 
Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville 
Affairs (PNG Parliament 2017:37) and the PNG prime 
minister (for example, The National 5/3/2018; PNG 
Post-Courier 8/3/2018, 3/5/2018). The prime minister’s 
expression of these views in particular has given rise 
to some concerns amongst Bougainvilleans that the 
national government may be positioning itself to delay 
the referendum beyond June 2020.
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Determining the good governance issue
In terms of the question of good governance, the 
national constitution provides that it will be determined 
by the process set out in the constitution for conducting 
five yearly reviews of the autonomy arrangements 
under which the ABG was established and is operating. 
The review process has two stages. The first involves 
reviews by independent experts on the financial 
aspects of autonomy, the Bougainville government’s 
services, and technical and legal aspects of autonomy. 
The second stage requires consideration of the expert 
studies by a meeting of the two governments as they 
jointly review the autonomy arrangements (see section 
337 of the national constitution). The first such review 
should have been held in 2010, five years after the ABG 
was established, but was in fact held three years later 
in 2013. Efforts are currently being made to conduct 
the second such review later in 2018. At the June 2018 
JSB meeting, the two governments agreed to an offer 
of UN support for the conduct of the first part of the 
review and approved UN nominations for the experts 
to undertake that part of the review. The JSB noted that 
the UN indicated that the reports of the experts should 
be available by the end of October 2018.
However, even if that review could not be held, it 
would simply mean that the two governments could 
not consult over good governance in the manner 
envisaged by the BPA and section 337 of the national 
constitution, and the likely outcome would be that the 
date of the referendum would be pushed back to the 
end of the five-year window — June 2020. 
The ABG power to decide that the referendum 
shall not be held
There is only one basis which would enable the 
referendum not to be held in the five-year window and 
that is where the ABG decides, in accordance with a 
procedure laid down in the Bougainville constitution 
(section 194) and after consultation with the national 
government, ‘that the referendum shall not be held’ 
(national constitution section 338(7)). The onerous 
requirements of section 194 of the Bougainville 
constitution are such that it is unlikely that the ABG 
would ever vote to stop the referendum being held. 
There is no other provision that enables the referendum 
to be deferred beyond the end of the five-year window 
within which the BPA and the national constitution 
state it must be held.
by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
(discussed in Part One of these two Discussion Papers).
Determining whether or not weapons disposal has 
occurred in accordance with the BPA
An obvious question is how the two governments are 
informed about whether weapons disposal has occurred 
in accordance with the BPA, and whether the ABG 
has been and is meeting the internationally accepted 
standards of good governance. On weapons disposal, 
the issue to be determined is whether the weapons 
have been disposed of according to the disposal plan 
in the BPA. In that connection, it should be noted that 
paragraph 324 of the BPA provides that the plan in the 
BPA is to be ‘fully implemented’ before ABG elections 
are to be held. As the first ABG elections were held in 
June 2005, the implication is that weapons were indeed 
disposed of ‘in accordance with the Agreement’ before 
the 2005 elections. Further, the United Nations (UN) 
certified in May 2005, shortly before that first ABG 
election, that the weapons disposal plan had been 
implemented (UN 2008:455). Hence there is no issue 
about whether implementation of the weapons disposal 
plan has been completed.
On the other hand, it is widely recognised in 
Bougainville that some weapons still remain available. 
For the most part they are weapons that were not 
disposed of under the plan of the BPA, largely because 
the former BRA elements associated with Francis Ona’s 
opposition to the peace process (from 1998 known 
as the Me‘ekamui Defence Force) did not take part 
in the disposal plan that the UN supervised between 
2001 and 2005, and because people have continued to 
refurbish World War II weapons. The ABG and former 
combatant groups, including those who supported 
Francis Ona, have on several occasions since 2016 
openly acknowledged the need for disposal of these 
additional weapons and agreed to enter into a new 
disposal process. This new process was approved by 
the June 2018 JSB and the funding needed to complete 
it is estimated at K12 million. While provision of the 
necessary funding is in doubt because of the PNG 
government’s fiscal crisis, there seems little doubt that 
most of the relevant Bougainville groups are willing to 
discuss the disposal of these additional weapons as part 
of the consultation required to reach an agreed date for 
the referendum.
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plan. Rather, the complex and detailed nature of the 
plan indicated that weapons disposal is intended to 
be a condition to be met before the referendum can 
be held. On good governance, Yalo mainly discussed 
various approaches to how the achievement of good 
governance might best be evaluated.
Otherwise, Yalo’s major argument was that weapons 
disposal and good governance are matters of such 
obvious importance that they must be achieved before 
the referendum can be held (Yalo 2014:14–15). His 
position might best be summarised as seeing weapons 
disposal and good governance as ‘conditions precedent’ 
that must be met before the holding of the referendum.
Almost the entire basis for Yalo’s arguments relates 
to the use of the word ‘conditions’ in paragraphs 
312 and 321 of the BPA as a basis for interpreting 
subsections 338(2) and (3) of the constitution. While 
section 278 makes the BPA available as an aid to 
interpretation ‘so far as it is relevant … where any 
question relating to interpretation or application of 
any provision’ of part XIV or the organic law ‘arises’, 
it is usually not necessary to look to such ‘originating’ 
documentary sources of constitutional provisions if the 
meaning of the provision is itself clear.
In this case, as already discussed, the inclusion 
of the words ‘notwithstanding any other provision’ in 
subsection 338(2) of the national constitution makes 
it clear that the aim is to provide for both the earliest 
possible date for the referendum and the last possible 
date. The provision states with absolute clarity that 
even if some other provision of the constitution or any 
other law might be interpreted as allowing a delay, the 
requirement of ‘not later than 15 years’ must be followed.
Several powerful arguments based on a more 
complete understanding of the relevant BPA paragraphs 
all militate strongly against the ‘conditions precedent’ 
analysis advanced by Yalo: 
1. While the BPA does use the word ‘conditions’ in 
relation to weapons disposal and good governance, 
as already noted, the term is not used in the 
national constitution provisions that give effect to 
the BPA. The omission of the term was a deliberate 
choice made by the joint national government/
Bougainville team that oversaw the drafting of the 
constitutional laws giving effect to the BPA. The 
term was omitted precisely because its use could 
have given rise to confusion.
2. While it is true that BPA paragraph 312(b) 
describes weapons disposal and good governance 
Are good governance and weapons disposal 
‘conditions’ that must be met? 
The only place where detailed argument has been 
advanced in favour of the proposition that good 
governance and weapons disposal are conditions that 
must be met before the referendum can be held is a 
2014 legal opinion by lawyer, Mr Nemo Yalo, who in 
2014 provided legal advice to then PNG chief secretary, 
Sir Mansupe Zurenuoc; advice that was then shared 
with the Bougainville public service officers working on 
referendum issues (Yalo 2014). Amongst other things, 
Mr Yalo’s advice asked whether weapons disposal and 
good governance were intended to be:
• considerations that must be taken into account by 
the two governments when consulting about and 
reaching agreement on the referendum date; or
• conditions that must be met before the referendum 
can be held, with failure to meet them resulting in 
deferral of the referendum beyond mid-2020.
Mr Yalo’s answer was that they were in fact 
intended to be conditions. His key argument concerns 
the use of the word ‘conditions’ three times in two 
paragraphs of the BPA (paras 312(a) and (b) and 321). 
In contrast, the word ‘conditions’ was not used in the 
provisions of the national constitution that give effect 
to the relevant BPA provisions on the referendum. 
However, as the PNG constitution (section 278) 
makes the BPA available ‘… as an aid to interpretation’ 
when interpreting any provision of part XIV or 
any organic law authorised by part XIV, Yalo relied 
on those provisions to say that the use of the word 
‘conditions’ with reference to weapons disposal and 
good governance in paragraphs 312 and 321 of the BPA 
allows the term ‘conditions’ to be read into subsection 
338(2) of the PNG constitution. 
He also argued that the use of the word ‘conditions’ 
in the BPA in relation to weapons disposal and 
good governance indicates intent that they must 
have been evaluated as having been achieved before 
the referendum could be held. Yalo summarised 
‘What appears under Section 337(3) [sic] reflects the 
intentions of the BPA clause 312. They are not mere 
considerations’ (2014:8).
In relation to the requirement for weapons disposal 
‘in accordance with the Agreement’, Yalo examined the 
provisions for the disposal plan in the BPA and argued 
that it is not necessary to examine whether weapons 
have in fact been disposed of in accordance with that 
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referendum be held on that issue at the earliest 
possible date, with the outcome binding on all 
parties. (In other words, a majority ‘yes’ vote would 
have given rise to constitutional obligations on 
PNG to implement it by facilitating Bougainville’s 
independence.) But some Bougainvilleans were 
either opposed to independence or had concerns 
about a referendum being held too soon while PNG 
opposed a referendum, viewing it as undermining 
its sovereignty. 
  A compromise was reached under which all 
sides agreed that a referendum would definitely 
be held, but would be deferred for an extended 
period. That deferral would allow time for the 
unification of Bougainville and rebuilding of trust 
between Bougainville and PNG. However, for 
Bougainvillean supporters of secession to agree to 
the compromise, it was essential that they had the 
strongest possible assurances that although deferred 
for an extended period, the referendum could not 
be deferred indefinitely. For this reason the BPA 
(paragraph 312) provides for an earliest possible 
referendum date (10 years after the first ABG 
election) and a latest possible date (15 years). It 
does so by saying the referendum shall be held ‘no 
earlier than 10 years and, in any case, no later than 
15 years’ after that first election [emphasis added]. 
The use of those words ‘in any case, no later’ made 
it clear that nothing could result in further deferral 
beyond the 15 year point.
  It would undoubtedly be a matter of grave 
concern to those involved in the negotiations for 
the BPA, who were initially pressing for an early and 
binding referendum, to find that the compromise 
they made has been interpreted as allowing a 
potentially open-ended deferral.
6. If Yalo’s argument were to be correct and failure 
to meet the ‘conditions precedent’ for holding the 
referendum could result in deferral beyond the 
fifteenth anniversary of the first ABG election, 
it would be expected that the BPA and the 
constitution would deal with the consequences of 
such deferral. For example, provision would be 
expected about such basic matters as the process for 
making a decision on deferral, how long the deferral 
should be and what would happen in the meantime, 
and when a further evaluation of the conditions 
would occur. 
as conditions, it is far more significant that the 
paragraph makes them conditions to be taken into 
account when setting the referendum date. There 
is no place in the BPA where they are described as 
conditions that must be met before the referendum 
is held, nor is that clearly implied anywhere. In fact, 
the opposite is true.
3. The use of the word ‘guarantee’ in the opening 
words of paragraph 312 relates first and foremost 
to the period within which the referendum must be 
held. It is a guarantee that the referendum will be 
held no earlier than 10 years after and ‘in any case, 
no later than 15 years after’ the first ABG is elected. 
The use of the word ‘guarantee’ is a powerful signal 
of intent on the period within which the date can be 
delayed.
4. The word ‘conditions’ is used in the BPA with 
reference to the process of weapons disposal and the 
quality of government, known as good governance. 
The BPA requires that the questions of whether 
the process has been completed and the quality 
achieved be considered before the two governments 
agree a referendum date. That requirement does not 
of itself denote that the process must be evaluated 
as complete and the quality evaluated as having 
been achieved before agreement on the date can be 
reached.
5. The argument that use of the word ‘conditions’ in 
the BPA shows the intention of the BPA, thereby 
shedding light on the intended meaning of section 
338 of the constitution, is misconceived. While 
section 278 of the national constitution makes the 
BPA available as an aid to interpretation of the 
constitution, it also specifies that the BPA must not 
be interpreted in a legalistic manner, but rather by 
reference to its intention. It is contrary to section 
278 to interpret the intention of the constitution, 
and the BPA, by heavy reliance on the use of a 
single word — conditions — without reference to 
the intention of the broader set of provisions about 
setting a referendum date.
  What do we know of the intentions in that 
regard? Ample evidence is available that the BPA 
provisions on the referendum represent a set of 
compromises amongst deeply divided parties 
directed to ending violent conflict. As discussed 
in Part One, in the early stages of the negotiations 
on the BPA, the strongly preferred position of 
Bougainvilleans supporting secession was that a 
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only agreed at the June 2018 JSB meeting), on whether 
weapons disposal has occurred in accordance with 
the BPA, and on whether the ABG has been and is 
being conducted in accordance with internationally 
recognised standards of good governance, followed 
by consultation between the two governments on the 
date. Because the good governance issue has yet to be 
determined — through the process for review of the 
autonomy arrangements — it is not yet possible to 
begin discussing the actual date.
In proposing a target date in June 2019, the ABG 
and PNG governments consciously set a date a year 
before the end of the five-year window, the aim being 
to provide some flexibility for planning purposes. For 
example, if significant aspects of the agreed activities 
could not be completed in the time assumed in the 
planning documents, then by the time the actual date 
came to be determined, adjustments could be made to 
allow extra time to complete time-critical tasks. 
One problem arising from the setting of the target date 
is that the distinction between the target date and the 
actual date is not generally well understood. Rather, 
it has become widely understood in Bougainville that 
the actual date is now June 2019. In fact, it seems 
unlikely that the steps necessary for the conduct of 
the referendum can all be taken by mid-2019 and, as a 
result, it seems highly likely that the actual date will be 
later than that. 
Referendum on the same date as the ABG election?
Discussion of alternatives to the target date tend to 
assume that the referendum could be held as late as 
at the very end of the five-year window within which 
it must be held — that is, in June 2020. However, 
under the ABG constitution, the fourth general 
election for the ABG must be held at about the same 
time. The suggestion has sometimes been made that 
the referendum might be conducted together with 
that election, as there could be significant cost and 
administration advantages in holding them together.
It is not uncommon for referendums and national 
elections to be conducted together, with examples 
including the USA, Uruguay, Armenia, Taiwan, 
Slovakia and Cook Islands (ACE Electoral Knowledge 
Network 2006). In one recent example, in August 
2016, Zambia held a referendum on adoption of a new 
national constitution together with a national election. 
  The absence of such provision provides 
strong support indeed for the proposition that 
the wording of subsection 338(2) is directed to 
ensuring that the date for referendum cannot be 
delayed beyond the fifteenth anniversary. In fact, 
not only is no such provision included, but the BPA 
(paragraph 312(a)) and the constitution (subsection 
338(7)) provide only one avenue for a decision to 
prevent the referendum being held in the five-year 
window. That avenue is a decision of the ABG, 
made in accordance with procedures set out in the 
Bougainville constitution, that the referendum not 
be held (as discussed earlier in this paper).
Explanations of misinterpretation? 
If the arrangements as stated in the BPA and the 
constitutional laws are so clear, why then have so many 
people misinterpreted them? Possible reasons include 
the complexity of the provisions of the BPA and the 
constitutional laws and the fact that, at the national 
level, virtually no one (neither politician nor senior 
public servant) who participated in the negotiation of 
the BPA and the constitutional laws is now involved 
in their implementation, as mentioned earlier in this 
paper. A further significant consideration is that many 
in the national government are not familiar with 
the terms of the BPA nor the laws implementing it, 
and find it quite confronting that they apparently do 
require a referendum — and that independence for 
Bougainville must be an option.
Target date versus an actual date
At the JSB meeting in Port Moresby in May 2016, the 
two governments agreed on what they termed a ‘target 
date’ of 15 June 2019 for the referendum, one year 
before the end of the five-year window within which 
the referendum must be held. The target date was set 
to enable planning for the referendum to begin, for at 
the same JSB the governments agreed that an extensive 
plan of activities was needed for the preparation and 
conduct of the referendum. Planning these activities 
was not possible without an indicative or target date. 
However, the target date is definitely not (or not yet) 
the actual date. The main reason is that there are some 
steps that the constitutional laws require to be taken 
before the actual date can be determined. Those steps 
involve determinations on the criteria for enrolment 
to vote of non-resident Bougainvilleans (something 
dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 11 
DPA Discussion Paper 2018/5
for some certainty in ABG leadership in the immediate 
aftermath of the referendum, as it will be in this period 
that the national government and the ABG will need 
to consult about the results of the referendum. It 
normally takes some time after the return of the writ 
ends the ABG general election, before the newly elected 
president is able to put together his or her cabinet. 
This consideration alone suggests that it would be 
important that the referendum is held a few months 
before or after the ABG election. The period for the 
conduct of an ABG general election is usually around 
three months, taking account of the time needed for 
campaigning, voting and scrutiny. 
The setting of dates for the ABG general elections 
is done under section 107 of the Bougainville 
constitution, which requires that they be held within 
three months before the fifth anniversary of the day 
fixed for the return of the writs for the previous general 
elections, or otherwise if the Bougainville legislature 
decides by a three-quarters absolute majority vote to 
call an earlier election. The date for the return of the 
writ in the last ABG election was 15 June 2015 and so 
it can be anticipated that the writs for the 2020 general 
election will be dated so as to be returned on or about 
15 June 2020. In practice, then, it is quite unlikely that 
a general election will be held earlier than in the last 
three months of the five year term of the ABG. This 
means that if the referendum cannot be held on the 
current target date, it probably cannot be delayed much 
longer than six to seven months — to the end of 2019 
or early in 2020. Alternatively, it would be possible for 
the ABG to amend its constitution to allow a short 
delay of the Bougainville elections until a little later 
than mid-2020, thereby allowing clear space for holding 
the referendum in the middle of 2020.
What about fiscal self-reliance?
Statements are sometimes made that ‘fiscal self-
reliance’ for Bougainville and its government is also a 
condition for the referendum to be held (or perhaps 
for independence for Bougainville to be considered). 
In fact there is no such requirement in the BPA or the 
constitutional laws. 
There are provisions concerning ‘fiscal self-reliance’ 
in the BPA and the constitutional laws. They do not 
relate, however, to the referendum arrangements. 
Rather they concern aspects of the financial 
arrangements for autonomy and in particular concern 
The advantages and disadvantages of holding 
referendums and elections together were summarised in 
a 2006 advice on the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 
(ibid.), which separates ‘practical’ from ‘political’ 
matters. Advantages of a practical nature in holding 
elections and referendums together relate mainly to cost 
savings in being able to distribute both sets of ballot 
papers at the same time, use of the same registers of 
voters, polling places and personnel, and so on. Political 
advantages relate mainly to the possibility of increased 
voter turnout due to voter interest possibly being 
amplified by the combination of the two processes. 
Practical disadvantages include the logistical and 
economic burden on the country, amongst other things, 
because processes such as counting, tabulation and 
reporting are be more complex, take longer and be more 
costly. Voter education and information campaigns are 
also be more complicated and costly. Political problems 
include risks of protest votes against government 
spilling over and having an impact on voting in the 
referendum. Further, campaign messages can be more 
difficult to convey, in part because there can often be 
cross-party campaigning (for example, parties opposing 
one another in the election may find themselves on the 
same side in the referendum or vice versa).
There could be a number of specific administrative 
problems involved in holding the Bougainville 
referendum and the ABG election together. For 
example, there would be two different administrative 
authorities involved, the Bougainville Referendum 
Commission for the referendum and the Office of the 
Bougainville Electoral Commission for the election. 
There would be different rolls of voters, and probably 
different voting systems (limited preferential voting 
for the ABG election and effectively the ‘first-past-the-
post’ system for the referendum). There would be a 
need to differentiate the ballot papers, particularly to 
assist illiterate voters. In this context, it also needs to be 
remembered that each voter in an ABG general election 
receives four ballot papers (one each for the president, 
the regional women’s and ex-combatant’s seats and a 
single member constituency) and so requiring voters to 
receive an additional and rather different referendum 
ballot paper could be a significant source of confusion, 
especially for illiterate or semi-literate voters. There 
would be serious risks of administrative overload 
because of the different requirements.
A significant political consideration in relation to 
the Bougainville referendum is that there will be a need 
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of the national constitution operate. A widespread 
concern has emerged that the BPA will cease to operate 
at the end of the five-year window within which the 
referendum must be held (by mid-June 2020). The 
suggestion is that at that point, if Bougainville does 
not become independent, the autonomy arrangements 
will cease to operate, as will the immunity from 
prosecution in relation to ‘offences arising from 
crisis-related activities in relation to the Bougainville 
conflict’ provided for under section 344 of the national 
constitution. In fact, there is no basis at all for any 
fears that the autonomy and immunity provisions 
will cease to operate. The national constitution makes 
no mention of any ‘cut-off ’ date in relation to any 
of the provisions in question. Both autonomy and 
the immunity for prosecution continue to operate, 
unless an amendment to the constitutional laws is 
made. However, under section 345 of the national 
constitution, no such amendment can be made without 
the prior agreement of the Bougainville legislature, 
through a vote of the legislature which normally must 
follow an extensive process of negotiation (section 217 
of the Bougainville constitution).
Gender issues
Questions arise as to whether many women in 
Bougainville will enjoy full freedom to vote in the 
referendum. There is no doubt that the matriliny 
that operates in most Bougainvillean societies helps 
women in Bougainville to have a higher status than is 
commonly the case elsewhere in PNG. Further, there 
are some women that are able to operate relatively 
freely in the public sphere. They include senior women 
who have high standing in society in some areas as well 
as senior personnel in some Bougainville-based NGOs, 
the three women representatives in the Bougainville 
legislature, and the women members in the new system 
of community governments established by the ABG 
in 2017 to replace the previous councils of elders — 
although there is anecdotal evidence of former council 
of elders members resisting the changes under the 
community government system (George 2018). But as 
discussed in Part One, at the level of the family and the 
landowning clan lineage, many women are not free to 
play public roles. At the family level, many women are 
restricted in the roles that they can play in decision-
making on such important matters as where they will 
reside and build houses (Hamnett 1977) and how the 
the point where economic activity in Bougainville 
has expanded to a point where revenues collected 
in Bougainville from company tax, customs duties 
and GST are sustainably greater than the cost to the 
national government of its principal grant to the 
ABG (the annual recurrent unconditional grant; see 
the organic law, sections 39 and 40). At that point, 
additional revenues from those three sources must be 
shared between the two governments on a basis that 
must be negotiated, and the ABG gains the right to 
adjust the rate of personal income tax in Bougainville 
by as much as 5 per cent. 
Beyond that rather technical meaning of fiscal 
self-reliance, there is a broader meaning to the phrase 
which relates to whether Bougainville has the financial 
resources to be self-reliant, whether for the purposes of 
autonomy or for independence (see Chand 2017). 
Neither meaning of fiscal self-reliance is a 
legal precondition to either the referendum or 
independence. Nevertheless, the broader meaning of 
that expression can be expected to be an issue of some 
practical significance when considering options to be 
included in the question or questions to be put in the 
referendum and when voters make choices between 
possible responses to any such question. It will need 
to be a consideration in the course of consultations on 
the referendum date (under subsection 338(2)) and 
can be expected to be of great importance in any post-
referendum consultations about possible independence. 
There is evidence that many Bougainvilleans have 
quite limited understanding of the extent of fiscal 
resources that would be needed for independence 
and the few options that Bougainville has available to 
it in order to access the levels of resources required 
(Development Transformations 2013:15; UNDP 2014:18, 
20–30). One study notes the efforts of the ABG 
leadership in ‘drawing attention to the economic 
viability of an independent Bougainville’, but points 
out that ‘the question is not on the forefront of most 
people’s minds’ (UNDP 2014:18). This suggests a need 
for awareness campaigns to help voters understand the 
practical financial requirements for independence.
Does autonomy continue after the referendum?
A major source of concern in Bougainville 
that has arisen at various times since 2015 is a 
misunderstanding about the period within which the 
autonomy and immunity from prosecution provisions 
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claims. Under the organic law (schedule section 
1.3), the two governments are required to ensure 
‘that all arrangements are made, staff, facilities and 
funding provided and all steps taken to enable and 
facilitate … the proper and convenient performance 
of the functions of the Agency [the BRC] and of each 
Returning Officer’.
As of June 2018, no funding had flowed from the 
two governments to the BRC. One issue here has been a 
technical question of the steps involved in establishing 
the national government trust account which needs 
to be set up for the BRC to be able to lawfully receive 
funds. But an additional and more serious problem 
concerns the extreme fiscal crisis in which the PNG 
government finds itself in mid-2018. Of an announced 
K20 million said to have been allocated to referendum 
purposes in 2018, the June 2018 JSB was advised 
that just K1.2 million was available. That figure was 
nowhere near the K5–K6 million needed to undertake 
the first major BRC task, that of compiling the register 
of voters.
Is the referendum outcome binding on the 
national government?
As was agreed between the parties negotiating the BPA, 
following the intervention of Alexander Downer (see 
Part One), the outcome of the referendum will not be 
binding on the national government. The BPA states 
that ‘the outcome will be subject to ratification (final 
decision-making authority) of the National Parliament’ 
(para. 311(a)) and that the two governments ‘will 
consult over the results of the referendum’ (para. 
311(b)). The provisions of the national constitution 
giving effect to paragraph 311 of the BPA are 
worded differently. They state (section 342) that the 
governments ‘shall consult over the results’ and that the 
results shall be taken to the national parliament ‘subject 
to the consultation’. In other words, if it were to be 
agreed to by the two governments in the course of the 
consultation that there is no need for the results to go 
to the parliament for the time being and, for example, 
that the governments agree to continue consultation on 
an annual basis, that would be permissible. 
While it seems clear that there is no requirement 
that the results go to the parliament, it also seems 
that if there is to be any enforceable decision on the 
results, it is only the parliament that can make the 
decision. This point emerges from subsection 342(2), 
financial resources of the family will be raised and 
used (Eves et al. 2018). This tendency to patriarchy in 
Bougainville’s matrilineal societies seems to extend to 
most spheres of human activity. Although no research 
has been done on the issue in Bougainville, comments 
about how limitations on the roles of women in PNG 
extend to their roles in electoral processes made in the 
US State Department’s 2016 report on human rights in 
PNG may well apply in Bougainville:
the deeply rooted patriarchal culture impeded 
women’s full participation in political life. The 
political participation of women was often 
limited, since there were social expectations for 
them to vote along tribal and family lines (US 
State Department 2016:13).
This aspect of the situation of women may need to 
be taken into account in awareness campaigns about 
enrolment to vote, voting, and making choices when 
voting. So far, these possible needs of women have 
not been taken into account in awareness exercises. 
The requirement that at least two of the seven BRC 
members must be women was presumably intended to 
ensure that gender issues in relation to the referendum 
are taken into account. But as yet the BRC has not met 
and there are no women on the BRC-TC.
Are there prescribed voter turnout or results 
quorums?
There is no requirement for a minimum voter turnout 
for the referendum result to be valid (a turnout 
quorum), nor for a particular majority of voters who 
actually cast votes (results quorum). While there is no 
requirement for either a turnout or a results quorum, 
clearly the extent of the turnout will be a significant 
factor in determining the legitimacy or credibility of 
the outcome. In this connection it should be noted 
that turnout in ABG general elections, which has been 
higher than that in general elections for the national 
parliament, has never been higher than 63.6 per cent 
(the figure in the 2010 ABG general election).
Cost of the referendum 
The costs of conducting the referendum have been 
discussed by the BRC-TC and are estimated at K127 
million, K90 million of which is classified as ‘core’ 
referendum costs, the balance being costs of such 
things as a weapons disposal program and meeting 
the PNG Electoral Commission’s outstanding financial 
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ultimately a matter for the parliament which ‘would 
consider the question with great seriousness, with 
the backdrop of our understanding of the country. 
We have a diverse and tribal country, so we can 
ask ourselves, where does it stop?’ (Callick 2015). 
In March 2018 he was reported as saying that ‘any 
outcome of the referendum will have to be endorsed 
by Parliament, which basically means that the people 
of Bougainville will also [have to] convince the people 
of Papua New Guinea as well through their elected 
leaders’ (PNG Post-Courier 10/3/2018). In April 2018 
he told the parliament: 
If this Parliament does not ratify the outcomes of 
the referendum, we don’t want to create anxiety 
among our people. We must make sure that 
this is a realistic outcome that will happen in 
our country. So it must be discussed in a frank 
and open manner so that we are not going to 
build the hopes and aspirations of the people 
of Bougainville to a degree where when the 
Parliament does not ratify the outcome, people 
of Bougainville feel that they are being let down 
(PNG Post-Courier 13/4/2018). 
On more than one occasion, he has stated that he 
expects that every MP will vote against independence 
when the referendum outcome is discussed in 
parliament. For example, in May 2018 he said:
After the vote in 2019, regardless of the 
question — the outcome must be tabled in 
Parliament … I can assure you that every 
Member of Parliament will vote in the interests 
of a unified and harmonious country (PNG 
Post-Courier 3/5/2018).
At the same time, however, the two governments 
have given attention to the need to plan carefully to 
ensure that the period following the referendum is 
managed in a peaceful manner. In particular, at the JSB 
meeting in May 2016, the two governments agreed on 
a work program involving 11 separate work streams for 
preparations for the referendum (see Appendix 2), one 
of which involved preparations for a peaceful transition 
following the referendum. This work stream was 
closely related to those on reconciliations and weapons 
disposal. The main point of the work stream was to 
ensure that whatever happened after the referendum, 
the two governments would continue to deal with the 
situation in a peaceful way. At the June 2018 meeting 
which states that if the results go to the parliament, the 
speaker shall furnish the executive of the ABG a copy 
of the minutes of the relevant proceedings ‘and of any 
decision made in the National Parliament regarding 
the referendum’. It seems likely that any court called 
upon to interpret section 342 would be guided by the 
provisions of the BPA about ‘final decision-making 
authority’ being vested in the national parliament. (As 
discussed already, under national constitution sub-
sections 278(3) and (4), the BPA can be used as an 
aid to interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
constitutional laws and the BPA must be ‘interpreted 
liberally, by reference to its intentions’.)
The fact that the outcome of the referendum is not 
binding on the national government is still a surprise 
to some Bougainvilleans. Upon realising this fact, 
some tend to express the view that if the outcome 
is not binding then the referendum has little value. 
However, the leaders who negotiated the compromise 
on the referendum late in 2000 were clearly of the view 
that there was value in what was agreed. It must be 
emphasised that what is provided for is not merely the 
holding of the referendum, but also a constitutional 
requirement that the two governments consult about 
the results.
Peaceful transition following the referendum
There is a range of ways in which the two governments 
(and other interest groups) could respond to 
developments after the referendum. For example, as 
discussed in the previous section of this paper, the 
two governments could consult about the outcome 
and might agree to consult over an extended period. 
Such consultation might lead to a range of possible 
outcomes including, perhaps, the negotiation of a new 
peace agreement. On the other hand, it would also be 
possible for the outcome to be taken quickly to the 
parliament. The PNG prime minister has made several 
statements in the first half of 2018 indicating that he 
expects the outcome to go to the parliament and for the 
members of the parliament to vote unanimously against 
independence. 
Indeed, in some of the many statements he has 
made about the referendum in the first half of 2018, 
Prime Minister O’Neill has appeared to be mounting 
a campaign to encourage the national parliament to 
take a stand against independence. In September 2015, 
he emphasised that the question of independence was 
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whether the referendum can be delayed beyond 
mid-2020 and what parliament will do following the 
referendum. So far, uncertainty sometimes caused 
by the mixed messages seems to be outweighed by 
the sense that there is general agreement between 
the governments that the referendum will be held. 
However, if the necessary funds for core referendum 
activities such as preparation of voter rolls do not begin 
to flow soon, there may be risks that the growing unity 
of the leadership will be undermined.
Conclusions
In the two years since May 2016, when the JSB agreed 
on 11 work streams for preparation for the referendum, 
the record on progress in that preparation has been 
mixed. The May 2016 JSB decision setting a target date 
for the referendum of June 2019, the promulgation 
in August 2017 of the charter establishing the BRC, 
and the seven meetings of the BRC-TC in the period 
to mid-August 2018 have been the major positive 
factors in progress. However, the lack of funding 
for the BRC and the consequent delays in the BRC 
engaging in the process of updating the roll for voters 
in Bougainville and developing a new roll for non-
resident Bougainvilleans is a worrying sign that the 
progress made to date may not be maintained. So far, 
these potential signals of concern have not seriously 
dented confidence amongst Bougainvilleans that the 
referendum will be held. But that situation is changing 
due to Prime Minister O’Neill’s mixed messages in the 
first six months of 2018 and delays in the grant of funds 
so badly needed by the BRC if it is to start fundamental 
steps such as enrolment of voters.
There are still important aspects of the quite 
complex referendum arrangements about which 
misunderstandings persist. They include issues about 
whether the autonomy arrangements in the BPA cease 
at the end of the five-year window within which the 
referendum must be held. Undoubtedly, however, the 
most serious misunderstanding are about whether 
negative assessments of not only weapons disposal 
but also good governance by the ABG could result in 
deferral of the referendum beyond the end of that same 
window. On the basis of the evidence and arguments 
presented in this paper, there is little room for doubt 
that such assessments do not permit such a deferral.
In terms of whether the referendum arrangements 
are contributing to peacebuilding in Bougainville, 
of the JSB, the two governments agreed to establish a 
joint taskforce to undertake ‘post-referendum scenario 
planning’ with a view to reporting to the governments 
before the end of 2018 ‘with a particular emphasis on’:
• ensuring peaceful acceptance of the referendum 
results 
• timely consultation between the governments 
about the results of the referendum
• reference to the parliament for timely ratification 
only if the two governments agree
• developing an agreed basis for the ongoing 
relationship between Bougainville and PNG 
(JSB 2018:4–5). 
They also agreed on the need to hold a joint 
‘summit’ on post-referendum planning to be held in 
Bougainville before the end of 2018.
Bougainville leadership unification around the 
referendum arrangements
As indicated in the introduction to Part One of 
these paired Discussion Papers, the referendum 
arrangements are part of a wider set of arrangements, 
all intended to promote peace in Bougainville — to 
transform a situation where divisive violent conflict 
previously prevailed. So far any assessment of the 
contribution of the referendum arrangements to 
bringing peace would be mixed. For several years after 
the BPA was signed, the Me‘ekamui government led 
by Francis Ona continued to refuse to participate in 
the process in large part because they claimed that a 
referendum was not needed, because Bougainville was 
already independent under the unilateral declaration of 
independence (UDI) of May 1990. After Ona’s death, 
while part of the Me‘ekamui factions began cooperating 
with the ABG, they all remained suspicious about 
the referendum. But since it has become evident that 
real progress is being made towards organisation of 
the referendum, the Me‘ekamui factions’ leaders have 
gradually been working more closely with the ABG, 
especially in relation to planning the new weapons 
disposal process. In general they are no longer asserting 
that independence has already been attained through 
the 1990 UDI and are supporting the referendum. 
On the other hand, the Me‘ekamui leaders are all 
also watching closely what is being said and done in 
referendum preparations, and the sometimes mixed 
messages coming for Prime Minister O’Neill about 
whether the referendum will be about independence, 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm16                                                                                                                             Department of Pacific Affairs
Anthony Regan
peace process since 1994 and works as an adviser to 
the Autonomous Bougainville Government in relation 
to legal issues arising in the preparations for the 
referendum.
Endnotes
1. The full text of the Bougainville Peace Agreement is 
available on a number of websites, for example on the 
United States Institute for Peace website.
Appendix 1
Daniel Tulapi’s posts about the Bougainville referendum 
have appeared on several different social media 
sites, including a WhatsApp group site (PNG Think 
Tank Group TTG1). The following is an unedited 
reproduction of his post on The Voice-Bougainville 
Facebook page (accessed 17/8/2018):
Daniel Tulapi, What’s New in PNG
June 8
Can Parliament of Papua new Guinea Amend the 
Constitution of Papua new Guinea adopted in 1975 on 
independence day? No. Parliament has no power to 
amend the Constitution.
Does Parliament of Papua new Guinea have power 
to amend the Constitution to grant independence to a 
province (Bougainville ) ???
No. Not at all. Period. Constitution of Papua 
new Guinea does not authorized independence and 
referendums.
Parliament has power only to make constitutional 
laws or organic laws but has no authority to amend the 
1975 independence constitution that created Papua new 
Guinea and the National Parliament itself which is a 
creation by the 1975 independence constitution .
Any addition to the Constitution or any 
amendment to add new additional provisions to the 
1975 independence Constitution requires referendum 
and vote by all the people of Papua new Guinea not by 
Members of Parliament.
The Bougainville referendum is unconstitutional 
and illegal. A province or a tribe of the 1000 tribes of 
Papua new Guinea has no right to seek independence 
from the independent State of Papua new Guinea under 
no special circumstances.
The military Forces or Defence forces of Papua new 
Guinea is established by the Constitution to protect the 
there is no doubt that the very act of inclusion of the 
referendum arrangements in the BPA contributed to 
bringing the conflict to a peaceful conclusion. The 
fact that the referendum was promised by the BPA 
ensured that the majority of BRA members committed 
themselves to the peace process. Further, the progress 
made since 2016 in organising the referendum has been 
the main factor encouraging the Me‘ekamui factions to 
support the peace process and commit themselves to 
participation in a new weapons disposal process. 
In general, that progress towards holding the 
referendum has contributed to increased faith amongst 
Bougainvilleans in the willingness of the national 
government to honour the agreed arrangements. 
However, the prime minister’s mixed messages and the 
lack of funds for the BRC are beginning to give rise 
to doubts amongst some Bougainville leaders about 
whether the referendum will be held within the time 
required by the BPA and the national constitution. 
Failure to hold the referendum within the five-year 
window of 2015 to 2020 would be a major setback to 
peacebuilding.
The biggest challenge in terms of the referendum 
arrangements contributing to peacebuilding could 
come after the referendum. There has been no opinion 
polling in Bougainville and amongst non-resident 
Bougainvilleans about how people propose to vote in 
the referendum and that fact, together with the lack of 
agreement to date on the question or questions to be 
asked, means that it is impossible to make confident 
predictions about the results of the referendum. 
Nevertheless, there are widespread assumptions 
that the likely outcome will be a vote heavily in 
favour of independence. Putting the results quickly 
to parliament and campaigning for a unanimous 
vote by the parliament against independence could 
seriously undermine the progress in peacebuilding in 
Bougainville. It is to be hoped that the work envisaged 
by the June 2018 JSB in relation to achieving peaceful 
transition after the referendum will help both the ABG 
and the national government to find ways to manage 
the post-referendum situation in a way that sustains 
progress in peacebuilding.
Author notes
Anthony Regan is a Fellow in the Department of Pacific 
Affairs at The Australian National University who has 
advised Bougainvillean parties to the Bougainville 
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However the fight for resources ownership and 
fight against exploitation by Businesses and foreigners 
must not include fight for Independence from State of 
Papua new Guinea. The fight for resources is a fight for 
all PNG United we stand as one Nation including our 
Defence forces as one people PNG.
On this note the Bougainville copper mine the 
biggest in the world must be given ownership to 
Bougainville landowners. The PNG Government shall 
impose sales export earnings tax. Foreign multi national 
corporations like Rio tinto are free to invest through 
buying of shares from the customary landowners.
The PNG Government and foreigners like oil 
search and ExxonMobil must not own oil and gas and 
gold and copper in Papua new Guinea.
Constitution of Papua new Guinea says Papua new 
Guinea government shall buy copper. Gold. Oil. Gas 
from customary land title holders.
The government included provincial governments 
in PNG and foreign Multi national corporations do not 
own Oil. Gas. Copper. Gold resources in Papua new 
Guinea declared by Constitution of Papua New Guinea.
Spoken by Former Chairman of constitution and laws 
committee of Papua new Guinea National Parliament. 
Honourable Daniel Bali Tulapi LLB.LLM
Appendix 2
The 11 work streams approved by the May 2016 
JSB meeting
Work stream Anticipated output
1. Electoral process Conduct of a free and fair 
Bougainville referendum
2. Weapons disposal Conducive environment for 
a free and fair Bougainville 
referendum
3. Good governance 
assessment
Strong government systems to 
implement the Bougainville 
referendum process and the 
referendum outcomes
4. Civic education and 
engagement (awareness)
Better informed population 
to make an informed choice
1975 constitution and territorial boundaries of Papua 
new Guinea by use of military forces.
Any abuse of Parliament privilege to grant 
independence to any province or tribe in Papua new 
Guinea is unconstitutional Act and amounts to treason 
and the Defence forces shall arrest any executive 
government which proposes vote in Parliament to grant 
independence to any province or village in PNG.
In the case of Bougainville Julius Chan Prime 
Minister and his NEC & Cabinet did make the 
right decision to use force and the Defence forces 
to defend the Constitution territorial boundaries of 
Papua new Guinea.
In the case of Prime minister Bill skate he 
committed treason by promises of referendum and 
independence to Bougainville.
Bougainville and Parliament cannot and do not 
have constitution authority to discuss let alone vote on 
referendum and self determination and independence 
concerning a province of Papua new Guinea.
It was Bougainville through Honourable Sir 
Paul Lapun MP representing Bougainville and New 
Guinea who voted and signed for independent Papua 
new Guinea in 1973 under United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly resolution for self determination 
and independence.
When Bougainville is entertained by Parliament 
by threats by tags and tribal warlords for referendum 
flood gates for Independence by 1000 tribes in png 
will open and we will have one thousand 1000 tribes of 
independent States on the island of Papua new Guinea. 
This is reality which our Defence forces must discharge 
their constitution duty to protect disintegration 
of United Papua new Guinea God gracefully 
commissioned in 1973 and in 1975 independent State 
of Papua new Guinea.
I Daniel Bali Tulapi LLB.LLM was one of the 
Members of the cabinet of Prime minister Julius Chan 
that made the decision to protect the Constitution of 
Papua new Guinea on Bougainville conflict and any 
claim for Independence by tags must be met with 
military forces as commanded by our Constitution.
When we fight for ownership of our resources 
for example Bougainville copper and SHP oil and gas 
we fight for ownership and money of our resources 
and that is right and a constitution right to stop 
manipulations and stealing by foreigners through 
our politicians.
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